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HEALTH HIGHLIGHTS
Health Policy and the Syrian Chemical 
Weapons Crisis 
>>> David P. Fidler, M.Phil., J.D.
For health policy, armed conflicts constitute one of the most severe emergency contexts in which health, well-
being, and determinants of health are threatened. The Syrian civil war has proved no different, as health experts re-
peatedly lament the humanitarian debacle the Syrian conflict has become. The main distinguishing feature of the 
Syrian civil war has been the large-scale use of chemical weapons in August 2013. This essay analyzes the chemical 
weapons crisis and its diplomatic resolution from a health policy perspective, with particular attention on whether 
the handling of this crisis created positive health policy “spillover” opportunities for more effectively addressing the 
broader humanitarian disaster in Syria. The essay concludes that the chemical weapons crisis did not create such 
opportunities but rather harshly highlights the limited influence health policy has in preventing war and respond-
ing to the humanitarian crises armed conflicts cause.
As emergencies go, armed conflicts represent one of the most, if not the most, severe emergency contexts for health. For this rea-son, health experts have long identified war as a determinant of 
population and individual health and have worked to improve the health 
community’s role in preventing armed conflict and alleviating the health 
threats and suffering war causes.1 International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
recognizes the importance of health during armed conflict in rules de-
signed to protect, in different circumstances, the health and well-being of 
combatants and non-combatants.2 Similarly, prohibitions on the use of 
certain weapons, such as cluster munitions, reveal a health imperative in 
the laws of war.
However, armed conflicts, especially civil wars, continue to defy ef-
forts to prevent them and to apply IHL effectively during conflicts. As 
a result, health in combat zones suffers, often in terrible ways. The civil 
war in Syria offers another reminder of this grim pattern—a conflict often 
described as a humanitarian debacle with no end in sight.3 The combined 
estimates of those killed, injured, suffering depravation, and displaced in 
the conflict number in the millions. For many, this scale of death and suf-
fering triggers the right of other countries to use military force to intervene 
under the principle of the responsibility to protect. But, to date, neither the 
Security Council nor any individual country has moved to intervene with 
military force to stop the atrocities and suffering in Syria. From a health 
perspective, the Syrian civil war is, tragically, déjà vu all over again.
What distinguishes the Syrian civil war from other, recent armed 
conflicts is the large-scale use of chemical weapons in August 2013. This 
episode provoked unprecedented actions leading to the ongoing chemical 
disarmament of Syria—an important outcome for public health because 
it prevents use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government during the 
remainder of this conflict and any future wars. Although health actors, in-
stitutions, and policies have had little, if any, impact on the Syrian conflict’s 
overall trajectory, did they play a role in the chemical weapons crisis and its 
resolution? If so, does this role suggest new possibilities for health policy’s 
ability to influence the Syrian conflict and other wars in the future?
The YouTube effect 
The world became aware of chemical weapons attacks in Damas-
cus through videos of victims disseminated online. The videos conveyed 
powerful images of suffering and death that triggered a global outcry. The 
images communicated the physiological effects of chemical weapons on 
people and the frustration of medical personnel trying to administer care. 
The videos also reinforced why states have banned the development and 
use of such weapons in international law. The videos put a human face on 
the horrors of chemical weapons, showed the health consequences of cross-
ing the “red line” into chemical warfare, and served as testimony in favor of 
international intervention to prevent more atrocities. 
However, the YouTube effect raised difficult questions for those advo-
cating for an international response to the chemical weapons attack. Why 
should gruesome images of victims of chemical warfare generate more me-
dia, political, and health policy attention than the appalling level of death 
and suffering Syrians had been experiencing on a larger scale for a longer 
period of time from conventional warfare between rebel and government 
forces? Answering this question politically is more straightforward—large-
scale use of chemical weapons in Syria created concerns about escalation of 
the civil war into a regional conflict, the impact of outside military respons-
es to the chemical weapons attacks, the proliferation of chemical weapons 
within and outside Syria, and the future of the international prohibition 
on the development, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. 
From a health policy perspective, the heightened attention given to 
the chemical weapons incident has a complex, somewhat conflicted tex-
ture. First, the use of chemical weapons represented a dramatic moment in 
which a terrible situation for health confronted even more awful possibili-
ties, as evidenced by the YouTube-exposed calamities for individuals, com-
munities, and health services caused by the chemical attacks. Highlighting 
these attacks connected to long-standing health concerns about damage 
chemical weapons used in armed conflict would cause for combatants 
and non-combatants—concerns reflected in health advocates’ support for 
the ban on the development and use of chemical weapons. Political and 
health interests converged on the importance of emphasizing the horrors 
of chemical warfare. The videos graphically revealed something the health 
community desperately wanted to prevent going forward, which created 
strong incentives to force people to glimpse an abyss from which escape 
might be impossible. 
Second, this prevention objective did not necessarily translate into 
health community support for outside military intervention to deter fur-
ther use of chemical weapons and/or to punish the suspected perpetra-
tors. Debate about the benefits and costs of military strikes against the 
Syrian regime included warnings that such attacks could make the Syrian 
conflict worse for civilians trapped in the war zone—a scenario portend-
ing a deepening of the humanitarian crisis the “international community” 
was already failing to address. The political blowback from military strikes 
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against Syria would make more effective humanitarian assistance impos-
sible to create and sustain. In this sense, ubiquitous use of the videos cre-
ated or stoked incentives for military intervention, creating the danger that 
the situation would fall into a different abyss for health protection. Here, 
political incentives to use military force diverged from health interests in 
addressing the chemical attacks without making the existing humanitarian 
disaster worse.
Third, highlighting the tragedies of chemical warfare created oppor-
tunities to draw attention to the suffering of civilians in the Syrian con-
flict—suffering that had not, prior to the chemical attacks, produced ad-
equate international attention or effective responses. The question was not 
why chemical attacks should receive more attention but rather how could 
these attacks help re-frame international attitudes about the humanitarian 
catastrophe the Syrian conflict was causing. Preventing more chemical at-
tacks locked into the larger health policy objective of preventing, protecting 
against, and responding to harm to individual and populations health in 
the overall conflict. In other words, the strategic motivation for health was 
to create sufficient “spillover” from the outrage about the chemical attacks 
by using this incident to generate more action on relieving the suffering of 
victims of the Syrian civil war and moving the conflict towards some politi-
cal resolution. Whether the impact of the chemical weapons crisis could 
shift the political interests of protagonists towards stronger humanitarian 
assistance and resolution of the conflict was the main health policy question 
emerging from the initial global reaction to the attacks.
Breaking good: The agreement on Syrian chemical disarmament
The chain of events after the world learned of the chemical attacks ap-
peared to be breaking badly for health interests. Russia and China blocked 
Security Council responses to the use of chemical weapons, and certain 
countries, led by the United States and Britain, threatened limited military 
action against the Syrian government without authorization from the Se-
curity Council. These developments sparked a heated global debate about 
national and international legal justifications and authorities for military 
attacks, but, from a health perspective, this trajectory—characterized by 
great power squabbling—promised very adverse consequences. 
Limited military action would not change (and was designed not to 
change) the course of the Syrian civil war, leaving this conflict churning as 
destructively as before. However, as many warned, military intervention 
could make the conflict worse by sparking escalation internally (e.g., by 
the Syrian regime against the rebels) and externally (e.g., by greater involve-
ment by outside forces) in a context already constituting a humanitarian 
disaster. Sitting in the midst of the worsening maelstrom would be Syria’s 
chemical weapons, the security of which the chemical attacks revealed as 
a grave concern. As domestic support in Britain and the United States for 
military action against Syria weakened, the prospect of no meaningful re-
sponse to the chemical weapons incident looked possible, leaving even this 
health atrocity potentially unaddressed.
The rather unexpected development of a diplomatic strategy to disarm 
Syria of its chemical weapons without resort to military force prevented this 
health policy nightmare. The United States and Russia designed a frame-
work under which Syria agreed to join the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), which prohibits development and use of chemical weapons, and 
to undertake a rapid, internationally verified process of chemical disarma-
ment.4 This stunning turn of events, and the unprecedented agreements 
produced, flowed from strong alignment of strategic U.S. and Russian in-
terests in removing chemical weapons from Syria. President Obama’s “red 
line” demonstrated that the core U.S. interest in the Syrian conflict was to 
keep Syria’s chemical weapons off the battlefield. Syria’s chemical weapons 
had also long worried Russia—Syria’s most important foreign support-
er—creating, perhaps, an unspoken “red line” for Russia in this context. 
Whether by accident or intent, the United States and Russia managed 
to turn alignment of their strategic interests into peaceful, internationally 
monitored Syrian chemical disarmament. 
These interests, and their convergence, had little, in anything, to do 
with health concerns. Neither the U.S.-Russia framework agreement nor 
the Security Council resolution instructing Syria to disarm5 mention health 
as an objective or include provisions for assistance to victims of the chemi-
cal attacks. The strategy addressed the key threats to international peace 
and security related to the chemical attacks—Syria’s possession of chemical 
weapons and the threat of military force by the United States and other 
countries. The Security Council resolution does call for input from the 
Director-General of the World Health Organization to the UN Secretary-
General, where appropriate, on the UN’s role in the elimination of Syria’s 
chemical weapons. But, this limited role relates to health risks that chemical 
disarmament might create and development of practical ways to eliminate 
or minimize such operational risks.
However, the resolution clearly produces benefits important to health 
policy. If successfully completed, chemical disarmament of Syria eliminates 
health risks chemical weapons might pose in the Syrian conflict, and it pre-
vents Syrian chemical arms from proliferating within the country and re-
duces the likelihood of chemical proliferation by other countries. In short, 
the world will not have to endure more disturbing images from Syria or the 
region showing the consequences of chemical warfare. Further, bringing 
Syria into the CWC strengthens the ban on the development and use of 
chemical weapons, and this development might encourage other holdouts 
from the CWC, such as Angola, Egypt, Israel, and Myanmar, to join the 
treaty. In addition, the agreements avoided military attacks on Syria, which 
had the potential to deepen and expand the health crisis fueled by the Syr-
ian civil war. From a health perspective, and against expectations given the 
prevailing geopolitical divisiveness about Syria, great power management of 
the Syrian chemical weapons crisis has generated positive outcomes. 
No chemical weapons crisis “spillover” for health
As of this writing, the process of disarming Syria of its chemical weap-
ons was proceeding as planned, with the milestone of the destruction of 
Syria’s ability to make chemical weapons reported in late October 2013.6 
Although destroying Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons poses more dif-
ficult challenges, political commitment to the strategy appears firm on the 
part of the main players, including the Syrian government. 
However, the crafting and implementation of Syrian chemical disar-
mament has not created positive “spillover” effect for health concerns about 
the death, suffering, deprivation, and displacement the Syrian civil war has 
caused. Following its binding decision on Syrian chemical disarmament, 
the Security Council unanimously issued in early October 2013 a non-
binding statement indicating the Council was “appalled at the unaccept-
able and escalating level of violence and the death of more than 100,000 
people in Syria” and urged all parties to facilitate “immediate humanitarian 
assistance to the affected people of Syria, including by promptly facilitat-
ing safe and unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need of 
assistance[.]”7 
However, in late October 2013, Valerie Amos, UN under-secretary 
general for humanitarian affairs, told the Security Council that its non-
binding statement had no impact on the deteriorating humanitarian situ-
ation in Syria: 
I regret to report that, despite the Council’s grave alarm at the sig-
nificant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation, and its call 
for urgent increased humanitarian action, fighting continues to intensify 
across the country and its impact on civilians continues to grow each day. 
Ongoing assessments reveal a substantial increase in needs and in internal 
displacement. As winter begins to fall across the country for a third year 
19Fall 2013 Vol. 15, No. 1
HEALTH HIGHLIGHTS
since this conflict began, millions live in makeshift shelters, exposed to the 
elements and unprotected from the cold. . . . Diseases, including those eas-
ily preventable by basic hygiene and vaccination, are spreading at an alarm-
ing rate. Just last week we received reports of polio cases in Deir-ez-Zor . . . 
, which . . . mark the first polio outbreak in Syria in 14 years. In Aleppo and 
other cities, leishmaniasis is rife, disfiguring and scarring children’s faces for 
the rest of their lives. There are also worrying reports of rapidly increasing 
malnutrition. People suffering from chronic illnesses, such as cancer and 
diabetes, lack access to treatment, and they also are dying. Silently.8 
Amos noted that both the Syrian government and rebel forces contin-
ue to impede delivery of humanitarian assistance and that the UN appeal 
for relief work in Syria and neighboring countries had only reached 54% of 
needed funding—facts that suggested the failure to address the humanitar-
ian crisis was systemic rather than the fault of a few actors. She argued that 
“we immediately need more humanitarian action to reach the ordinary 
men, women and children who, through no fault of their own, are caught 
up in this conflict. No one is taking their obligations under international 
humanitarian law and human rights seriously.”
The confirmed appearance of polio in Syria created a new “crisis with-
in a crisis” as health advocates called for “vaccination ceasefires” in order 
to vaccinate people against the polio virus. Save the Children, a leading 
voice in the call for polio vaccination ceasefires in Syria, connected the ef-
fective chemical disarmament effort with the polio emergency by arguing 
“if chemical weapons inspectors can be allowed access across Syria with 
notebooks, surely aid workers can be allowed in with vaccines.”9 Reading 
between the lines with a broader health lens, arranging access for chemical 
disarmament purposes should also mean that space for humanitarian relief 
efforts should be greater than it is.
Such calls, and the linkage with the chemical disarmament effort, priv-
ilege polio as a health problem over the myriad of health threats rampant 
within Syria because of the armed conflict, in the same way the threat of 
chemical weapons became a priority health issue in the Syrian civil war. 
As previous experiences with vaccination ceasefires in other conflicts dem-
onstrate, such efforts rarely change the military or political dynamics of 
war, leaving the larger humanitarian tragedies of continued conflict unad-
dressed. Such ceasefires target specific infectious disease threats but do little, 
directly or indirectly, for systemic problems war creates for health policy. In 
the same way, chemical disarmament in Syria functions as a threat-specific 
effort not affecting the broader determinants of the horrific health out-
comes related to the civil war.
Conclusion
These observations do not mean that health emphasis of the damage 
caused by chemical weapons, support for Syrian chemical disarmament, 
and advocacy for polio vaccination ceasefires are misguided or illegitimate. 
Rather, they highlight the severe limitations health policy confronts in 
the emergency context of armed conflict, including brutal civil wars of 
concern to the great powers. Sometimes, as seen with the strategy crafted 
for Syria’s chemical disarmament, strategic political interests align in ways 
that produce positive outcomes for health. Sometimes—as with the civil 
war’s continued devastation of health, well-being, and the determinants of 
health—the violent struggle for power marginalizes health, leaving health 
experts and advocates to make increasingly desperate appeals for more ef-
fective humanitarian action or grasp at actions of more limited scope, such 
as ceasefires for vaccinating against a single disease. 
In its formulation of the principle of the responsibility to protect, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty iden-
tified three responsibilities within the principle—the responsibility to 
prevent, react, and rebuild.10 The Syrian conflict, including its chemical 
weapons emergency, reveals, again, that health policy has little influence in 
conflict prevention and the politics of reacting to humanitarian problems 
war creates. Whether a political solution to the Syrian conflict will emerge 
is not, at present, clear, but, if it does, health policy will face, again, a bleak 
landscape as health experts help shoulder the burden of the responsibility 
to rebuild in the post-conflict period. 
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